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CHAPTER 1 
Creating a Framework for Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring That Works 
Martin Guzman and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Debt matters. In recessions, high uncertainty discourages private spend-
ing, weakening demand. Resolving the problem of insufficient demand 
requires expansionary macroeconomic policies. But "excessive" pub-
lic debt may constrain the capacity for running expansionary policies.1 
Evidence shows that high public debt also exacerbates the effects of pri-
vate sector deleveraging after crises, leading to deeper and more prolonged 
economic depressions (Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor, 2013). 
Even if programs of temporary assistance (e.g., from the International 
Monetary Fund) make full repayment of what is owed possible in those 
situations, doing so could only make matters worse. If the assistance is 
accompanied by austerity measures, it would aggravate the economic situ-
ation of the debtor. 2 • J 
Distressed debtors need a fresh start, not just temporary assistance. 
This is in the best interests of the debtor and the majority of its creditors: 
precluding a rapid fresh start for the debtor leads to large negative-sum 
games in which the debtor cannot recover and creditors cannot benefit 
from the larger capacity of repayment that the recovery would imply. 
Lack of clarity for resolving situations in which a firm or a country 
cannot meet its obligations can lead to chaos. There can be extended peri-
ods of time during which the claims are not resolved and business (either 
of the firm or the country) cannot proceed-or at least cannot proceed in 
the most desirable way. In the meantime, assets may be tunneled out 
of the firm or country, or at the very least, productive investments that 
would enhance the value of the human and physical assets are not made. 
Within a country, bankruptcy laws are designed to prevent this 
chaos, ensuring an orderly restructuring and discharge of dehts. Such 
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laws establish how restructuring will proceed, who will get paid first, 
what plans the debtor will implement, who will control the firm, and 
so on. Bankruptcies are typically resolved through bargaining among 
the claimants-but with the backdrop of a legal framework and with a 
judiciary that will decide what each party will get, based on well-defined 
principles. 
Bankruptcy laws thus protect corporations and their creditors, facili-
tating the processes of debt restructuring. A more orderly process not 
only lowers transactions costs but precludes the deadweight losses associ-
ated with disorderly processes; in doing so, it may even lower the cost of 
borrowing. 
Good bankruptcy laws facilitate efficient and equitable outcomes in 
other ways; for instance, in encouraging lenders to undertake adequate 
due diligence before making loans. 
The benefits of a legal framework providing for orderly debt restruc-
turing have also been extended to public bodies, for instance, through 
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
But there is no comprehensive international bankruptcy procedure 
to ensure proper resolution of sovereign debt crises. Instead, the current 
system for sovereign debt restructuring (SDR) features a decentralized 
market-based process in which the debtor engages in intricate and com-
plicated negotiations with many creditors with different interests, often 
under the backdrop of conflicting national legal regimes. Outcomes are 
often determined on the basis not of principles but of economic power-
often under the backdrop of political power. Restructurings come too 
little, too late. 4 And when they come, they may take too long.' The lack 
of a rule of law leads to ex ante and ex post inefficiencies and inequities 
both among creditors and between the debtor and its creditors. 
Furthermore, unlike domestic bankruptcies, sovereign bankruptcy 
negotiations take place in an ambiguous legal context. Several differ-
ent jurisdictions, all with different perspectives, influence the process. 
Different legal orders often reach different conclusions for the same 
problem. It may not be clear which will prevail (and possibly none will 
prevail) and how the implicit bargaining among different countries' judi-
ciaries will be resolved. 
At the time we write this chapter, events are making the reform of 
the frameworks for SDR a major issue. Countries in desperate need of 
addressing profound debt sustainability issues, like Greece at the moment, 
are confronting the risks of a chaotic restructuring, and this discourages 
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them from undertaking the restructurings that are now recognized as 
desirable or even inevitable. 
Besides, the gaps in the legal and financial international architecture 
favor behavior that severely distorts the workings of sovereign lending 
markets. The emergence of vulture funds-investors who buy defaulted 
debt on the cheap and litigate against the issuer, demanding full payment 
and disrupting the whole restructuring process-as recently seen in the 
case of Argentine restructuring, is a symptom of a flawed market-based 
approach for debt crisis resolution. 
Recent decisions6 have also highlighted the previously noted interplay 
among multiple jurisdictions, none of which seems willing to cede the right 
to adjudicate restructuring to the others (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2015b). 
There is consensus on the necessity of moving to a different frame-
work, but there are different views on the table about how to move 
forward. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the financial com-
munity represented by the International Capital Markets Association 
(ICMA) recognize that the current system does not work well (ICMA, 
2014; IMF, 2014). They are proposing modifications in the language of 
contracts, such as a better design of collective action clauses (CACs) and 
clarification of pari passu-a standard contractual clause that is sup-
posed to ensure fair treatment of different creditors. These proposals 
are improvements over the old terms, but they are still insufficient to 
solve the variety of problems faced in SD Rs. And it is almost surely the 
case that new problems will arise-some anticipated, some not-within 
the new contractual arrangements. 
On the other hand, a large group of countries is supporting the cre-
ation of a multinational legal framework, as reflected in Resolution 
69/304 of the General Assembly of the United Nations of September 
2014, which was overwhelmingly passed (by 124 votes to II, with 41 
abstentions), and more recently in Resolution 69/L.84 of September 2015 
that established a set of principles that should be the basis of a statu-
tory framework for sovereign debt restructuring, passed with 136 votes in 
favor, 41 abstentions, and only 6 against (see Li, 2015).7 The framework 
should complement contracts, putting in place mechanisms that would 
establish how to solve disputes fairly. Building it on a consensual basis 
will be essential for its success. This in turn requires fulfilling a set of 
principles on which the different parties involved would agree, an issue 
that we analyze in this chapter. 
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While the importance of the absence of an adequate mechanism for 
SDR has long been noted (see also Stiglitz, 2006), five changes have 
helped to bring the issue to the fore and motivate the global movement 
for reform of existing arrangements. (r) Once again, many countries seem 
likely to face a problem of debt burdens beyond their ability to pay. (2) 
Court rulings in the United States and United Kingdom have highlighted 
the incoherence of the current system and made debt restructurings, 
at least in some jurisdictions, more difficult if not impossible. (3) The 
movement of debt from banks to capital markets has greatly increased 
the difficulties of debt renegotiations, with so many creditors with often 
conflicting interests at the table. (4) The development of credit default 
swaps (CDSs)-financial instruments for shifting risk-has meant that 
the economic interests of those at the bargaining table may actually be 
advanced if there is no resolution. (5) The growth of the vulture funds, 
whose business model entails holding out on settlement and using litiga-
tion to get for themselves payments that are greater than the original pur-
chase price and of those that will be received by the creditors who agreed 
to debt restructuring, has also made debt restructurings under existing 
institutional arrangements much more difficult. 8 
The sections in the remainder of this chapter are organized around the 
following topics: the objectives of restructuring; the current problems; the 
solution proposed by the ICMA and the IMF; analysis of the limitations 
of the ICMA-IMF solution; a set of further reforms that could be imple-
mented within the contractual approach; and the principles that should 
guide the creation of a multinational formal framework for SDR. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF RESTRUCTURING 
In absence of information asymmetries and contracting costs, risk-sharing 
(equity) contracts would be optimal; there would be no bankruptcy. 
But under imperfect information and costly state verification, complete 
risk sharing is suboptimal, and the optimal contract is a debt contract 
(Townsend, 1979).9 
Information asymmetries and costly monitoring characterize the world 
of sovereign lending, which explains the widespread utilization of sover-
eign debt contracts. The optimal debt contract may be associated with 
partial risk sharing, including default in bad states and a compensation 
for default risk in the form of a higher (than the risk-free) interest rate in 
good states. 
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If default were never possible, rhe borrower would absorb all the risk. 
Under the assumptions of risk-neutral lenders who can diversify their 
portfolios in a perfectly competitive environment, the expected utility of 
each lender (who is compensated for the opportunity cost)'° would be the 
same, but the borrower's would be lower than it would be with good risk.-
sharing contracts. Moreover, if the possibility of default were ruled out in 
every state of narure (for instance, through sufficiently high penalization 
of default), the amount of lending would be severely limited. 
The probability of entering into situations of debt distress depends 
on a range of economic conditions11 but also on the actions of the 
debtor." And once the distress arises, the debtor's capacity for production 
and repayment going forward will depend on how the debt situation is 
resolved. If the debtor defaults, he or she normally loses access to credit 
markets until a restructuring agreement is reached. 13 
The mechanisms in place for debt restructuring determine how all 
these tensions are resolved. A good system should incentivize lenders and 
debtors to behave in ways that are conducive to efficiency ex ante (i.e., 
the "right" decisions at the moment of lending) and ex post (i.e., at the 
moment of resolving a debt crisis). It should also ensure a fair treatment 
of all the parties involved. 
EFFICIENCY ISSUES 
A system that makes restructurings too costly induces political leaders 
to postpone the reckoning. When there are no mechanisms in place that 
would ensure orderly restructurings, the perceived costs of default to the 
party in power become too large. Therefore, "gambling for resurrection," 
delaying the recognition of debt unsustainability, may be the optimal 
strategy for the debtor. 
Delays are inefficient. They make recessions more persistent and 
decrease what is available for creditors if a default occurs.« In the pres-
ence of cross-border contagion, furthermore, the delay is costly not only 
to the given country but to those with which it has economic relations 
(Orszag and Stiglitz, 2002). 
The objective of the restructuring process itself must not be to maxi-
mize the flows of capital or to minimize short-term interest rates. Instead, 
the framework should ensure overall economic efficiency, a critical fea-
ture of which is ex post efficiency in a broader sense: it should provide 
the conditions for a rapid and sustained economic recovery. A system of 
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orderly discharge of debts would permit the debtor to make a more effi-
cient use of its resources, which may be in the best interests of both the 
debtor and the creditors. Normally, contractual and judicial arrangements 
should support this kind of ex post efficiency that is necessary for achiev-
ing Pareto efficiency. r5 
A curious feature of the current restructuring process is that coun-
tries that are in the process of restructuring typically face massive unde-
rutilization of their resources. This is because such countries cannot get 
access to external resources; financial markets often become very dys-
functional in the midst of a crisis, with adverse implications for both 
aggregate demand and supply. Creditors, focusing narrowly and short-
sightedly on repayment, force a cutback in government expenditures 
{austerity), and the combination of financial constraints and decreases 
in private and public demand bring on a major recession or depression. 
They wrongly reason that if the country is spending less on itself, it 
has more to spend on others-to repay its debts. But they forget the 
large multipliers that prevail at such times: the cutbacks in expenditure 
decrease gross domestic product (GDP) and tax revenues. The underuti-
lization of the country's resources makes it more difficult for it to fulfill 
its debt obligations-the austerity policies are normally counterproduc-
tive even from the creditors' perspective. 
Another critical feature is ex ante efficiency. A system that does not 
put any burden on the lenders ex post does not provide the right incen-
tives for due diligence ex ante. Selection of "good" borrowers requires, 
in general, specific actions from the lenders, such as screening (before 
lending) and monitoring (after lending). The existence of a mechanism 
for SDR would act as a signal that money will be lost unless due diligence 
is applied. 
Note that good due diligence will result in better screening and 
lending practices, so interest rates may actually be lowered as a result 
of better bankruptcy laws (i.e., more punitive bankruptcy procedures 
may so adversely affect lender moral hazard that financial markets 
become more dysfunctional). This is especially the case when, as now, 
large fractions of lending are mediated through capital markets, not 
banks. Arguably, that was one of the consequences of the passage of the 
creditor-friendly U.S. bankruptcy law reforms in 2005 (through the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act), which 
made the discharge of debt more difficult and led to a substantial 
increase in bad lending practices. 
,L 
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EQUITY ISSUES 
The framework for restructuring determines the incentives for creditors' 
behavior. A system that favors holdout behavior creates a perverse moral 
hazard problem that makes restructurings more difficult, or, on occasion, 
impossible. 
It also creates interdebtor inequities, as it increases the borrowing 
cosrs for those debtors more likely to need a restructuring (which is 
both an efficiency and an equity issue, as the lack of proper mecha-
nisms affects all countries but those that are riskier more severely). 
Of course, debtors who are more likely to default should pay a higher 
interest rate. The problem is that if the restructuring mechanism is 
inefficient-as the current system is-it overpenalizes these borrowers, 
and the ex post inefficiency also gets translated into an ex ante inef-
ficiency, as the unnecessarily high penalty discourages participation in 
the credit market. 
A flawed system like the current one that relies more on mechanisms 
for "bailouts" (such as the European Stability Mechanism) instead of 
providing mechanisms for restructuring also creates large intercreditor 
inequities, as only the creditors that get paid with the resources of the 
"bailouts" benefit, while the expected value of the claims of the other 
claimants (such as the creditors whose debts mature in a longer term, or 
the workers and pensioners whose wages depend on a production capac-
ity of an economy that decreases precisely as the consequence of the aus-
terity often associated with those plans) decreases. 
Finally, there is a problem of equity between formal and informal 
creditors-those who have a contract and those whose benefits are part 
of a social contract. This is one of the important ways in which sovereign 
debt is different from private debt. Typically, there are a large number of 
such claimants-pensioners or those depending on the government for 
health benefits or education. Though Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code (pertaining to the bankruptcy of public bodies) recognizes the 
importance of these claima,nts, in the absence of an international rule of 
law that gives such claims formal recognition, their claims are at risk of 
being made subordinate to those of the formal creditors. And the recog-
nition that this is so may itself have a distorting effect on the economy: 
it may encourage the formalization of such claims, even when such for-
malization may result in socially undesirable rigidities and undesirable 
institutional arrangements. 
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THE CURRENT PROBLEMS 
The current non-system does not achieve the described objectives of 
restructuring. Instead, it creates a host of inequities as well as inefficien-
cies. It overpenalizes debtors in distress, causing delays in the recognition 
of the problems. It leads to the "too little, too late" syndrome. In some 
cases, there is too much lending-and too much suffering later on; in 
other cases, there may be too little lending. Moreover, the legal frame-
works permit a situation in which a few specialized agents (the vulture 
funds) can block the finalization of a restructuring, imposing large costs 
on the debtor and on other creditors. This section describes various fac-
tors that lead to these problems. 
THE VULTURE FUNDS 
Restructurings involve a public good problem: each claimant wants to 
enjoy the benefit of the country's increased ability to repay from debt 
reduction, but each wants to be repaid in full. 
The existing frameworks fail to solve the public-good problem. Instead, 
they provide the conditions for the emergence of vulture funds. The vul-
ture funds are a class of holdouts that are not really in the business of 
providing credit to countries. Instead, they are engaged in "legal arbi-
trage." Their business consists in buying debt in default (or about to be 
in default) in secondary markets at a fraction of its face value. Then, they 
litigate in courts, demanding full payment on the principal plus interest 
(typically at an interest tate tbat already includes compensation for default 
risk). A victory in court brings exorbitant returns on the initial investment. 
Their modus operandi relies on a legal framework that has weak-
ened sovereign immunity and on a flawed design of contracts. They 
resort to activities (many of which are socially unproductive) to increase 
their bargaining power and to influence the decisions of the actors 
involved-including lobbying and threats about economic and political 
consequences of a failure to reach a settlement satisfactory to the credi-
tors (some liken it to extortion) to affect the debtor's behavior. Economic 
"extortion" is especially effective in influencing countries needing tO 
re-enter capital markets, and political extortion is especially effective in 
influencing governments whose officials have been engaged in illegal 
activities or who are motivated by a concern over their "standing" in the 
international community. 
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The presence of vulture funds creates huge inefficiencies and inequi-
ties in sovereign lending markets. It can even lead to the total impossi-
bility of debt restructuring. Recent events-in particular, the Argentine 
debt restructuring, which pitted the country against NML Capital 
(a subsidiary of the hedge fund Elliott Management)-show that these 
inefficiencies are a major issue. In that case, the presiding U.S. federal 
judge, Thomas Griesa, ruled in favor of the vulture funds and ordered an 
injunction that obliged Argentina to make payments to vultures and the 
holders of bonds denominated in foreign currency issued by Argentina in 
tbe 2005 and 2010 debt exchanges on a ratable basis, an interpretation of 
pari passu that requires Argentina to pay to the vulture funds their full 
judgment whenever it makes any payment under the exchange bonds, 
even if it is just a coupon payment, or otherwise any holder of exchange 
bonds would be barred from receiving payments. The injunction was 
based on a peculiar interpretation of pari passu,16 a contractual clause that 
is supposed to ensure equal treatment among equally ranked creditors. '7 
The design of contracts also facilitates the emergence of vulture funds. 
Many existing debt contracts do not have CACs-clauses that allow a 
majority of bondholders to agree to changes in bond terms (e.g., to reduce 
the value of the principal) that are legally binding to all the bondholders, 
including those who vote against the restructuring. Some contracts do 
include them, bur most are defined at the level of each individual bond. '8 
Under a unanimity rule, vulture funds can easily emerge. With CACs 
at the level of each security, vultures' behavior is more constrained but is 
still possible. They can still buy the minimum fraction that would block 
the restructuring of a unique series of bonds, and by doing so they would 
be able to block the whole restructuring. 
A formula for aggregation of CACs (over different classes of bonds), 
like the one proposed by ICMA discussed later in this chapter, would 
alleviate these problems. But it raises other questions: How are different 
bonds to be added together for purposes of voting (How do we adjust for 
differences in priorities and exchange rates)? It is clearly conceivable that 
a majority of junior bonds could vote to deprive more senior bonds of 
some of the returns they might have expected, given their seniority. There 
may even be ambiguity about which claimants should be included in the 
aggregation: Should foreign and domestic claimants be included?'9 
Clearly, the issues faced in SD Rs go beyond the design of CACs. 
These clauses are no panacea. If they were, there would be no need for 
bankruptcy laws that spell out issues like precedence and fair treatment. 
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Evidence shows that no country has relied on markets to solve bankrupt-
cies. Every country has a bankruptcy law. Theory also shows that under 
realistic conditions markets are not able to provide efficient restructur-
ings on their own, as they are unable to reach efficient solutions on their 
own in general, except under very restrictive and unlikely conditions 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). '°There are important market failures that 
are present in restructurings-either for corporations or for sovereigns. 
WEAKENING OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
AND THE CHAMPERTY DEFENSE 
The evolution of the legal frameworks has been instrumental for the emer-
gence of vultures and the debilitation of sovereign immuniry. Sovereign 
immuniry had first been challenged with the sanction of the Foreign 
Sovereign lmmuniry Act in 1976 (Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein, 
2014), and has more recently been challenged by litigation over the charn-
perry defense-an English common-law doctrine, later adopted by U.S. 
state legislatures, that prohibited the purchase of debt with the intent of 
bringing a lawsuit against the debtor (Blackman and Mukhi, 2010). 
The case Elliott Associates, LP v. Republic of Peru was a game changer 
for the interpretation oflegal frameworks affecting sovereign immuniry." 
Elliott had bought Peruvian debt in default and sued the country for 
full payment in the New York courts. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled that champerry applied, dismiss-
ing Elliott's claims. But the Second Circuit of Appeals reversed rhe deci-
sion, stating that the plaintiff's intent in purchasing the Peruvian debt in 
default was to be paid in full or otherwise to sue. Then, according to the 
Second Circuit, Elliott's intent did not meet the champerry requirement 
because litigation was contingent. Such an interpretation is absurd, as it 
was not reasonable to expect to be paid in full over a promise that had 
already been broken. The exorbitant returns obtained based on an inter-
pretation that was unreasonable to expect could have constituted a case of 
"unjust enrichment" (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2014c). 
In 2004, the New York state legislature effectively eliminated the 
defense of charnperry concerning any debt purchase above US$500,ooo 
dollars. That decision constituted a change to the understanding over 
which hundreds of billions of dollars of debt had been issued, redefining 
properry rights. This change in legislation ensured rhe good health of the 
vultures' business. 
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DISTORTIVE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
The problems are aggravated by the nontransparent use of CDSs. A 
CDS separates ownership from economic consequences: the seeming 
owner of a bond could even be better off in the event of a default, as the 
payments over the CDS would be activated in such an event. The opac-
ity of this market makes uncl~ar the real economic interests of those 
who have a seat at the restructuring bargaining table. They provide 
another reason for delayed restructuring, with its associated inequities 
and inefficiencies. 
THE UNBALANCED BACKGROUND FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
The legal frameworks and the bailout policies of the IMF determine 
the background of the negotiations (cf. Brooks et al., 2015). The cur-
rent arrangements favor short-term creditors against long-term creditors; 
included in the latter group are the "informal creditors" (citizens toward 
whom the sovereign has obligations, such as workers and pensioners). 
IMF bailout policies only aim at ensuring repayment in the short 
run. In practice, they have not been designed with the purpose of favor-
ing sustained economic recoveries. On occasion they even undermined 
them (both as a result of counterproductive conditionality and because 
of insufficiently deep restructuring), increasing the probability of a subse-
quent restructuring being needed down the road. 
In the case of Europe, the European Stability Mechanism leads to the 
same perverse effects. By construction, it is not a mechanism for debt 
restructuring but a mechanism for bailouts that gives creditor countries 
enormous power in the negotiations with a debtor country (Brooks and 
Lombardi, 2015). In the case of Greece, it was the main instrument by 
which the eurozone countries enforced their demands for policy decisions 
that were not in the best interest of the countty (at least as judged by the 
vast majority of people in the country, as reflected repeatedly in the polls, 
and by a large fraction of economists). 
POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES 
SDR mechanisms must take political economy issues into account. 
The costs of restrucruring are usually borne by different politi-
cal actors than those who created the problem. Political economy 
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tensions increase in times of distress, when the incumbent govern-
ment has larger incentives to achieve deals with short-term benefits 
but long-term costs that will be paid by the next government. One of 
the strategies for better short-term financing conditions is giving up 
on sovereign immunity. 
Every bad loan is equally the result of bad lending and bad borrowing: 
these are voluntary agreements. But a system the puts the onus on the 
debtor (i.e., making it more likely that more of the debt will be repaid) 
encourages bad lending-it encourages banks to encourage the govern-
ment today to borrow too much, exacerbating the already present dis-
tortion. (There is a further argument for putting more of the onus on 
the lenders: they are supposed to be the experts in risk analysis; that is 
supposed to be their comparative advantage. Government officials typi-
cally have no expertise and rely on the judgments of those in the financial 
market concerning reasonable debt levels.) 
Political costs are also often borne disproportionately by those willing 
to take actions-that is, to actually do the restructuring. Thus, a system 
that makes restructurings too costly exacerbates these natural political 
economy tensions, because it incentivizes debtors to delay the recogni-
tion of problems. 
Creditors' behavior may also worsen these distortions, for instance, 
by providing short-term lending at high interest rates to countries that 
are obviously in need of a restructuring, taking into account the dis-
torted incentives of the distressed debtors to make use of those funds, 
the "gambling on resurrection" behavior that we described earlier. Such 
short-term lending is, of course, risky: when the situation is bad enough, 
eventually there will be a restructuring. But the short-term creditors can 
typically charge a sufficiently high interest rate to compensate them for 
this risk. 
There are also political economy problems on the creditors' side. 
Sovereign bonds are an important form of collateral. A decrease in the 
value of bonds held by banks would decrease the value of collateral, 
affecting lending and (reported) profits. But when bonds (loans) are not 
marked to market,22 what matters is the recognition of the loss. A debt 
write-off forces the recognition of the loss.'' Thus, banks have incen-
tives to resist debt write-offs. The incentives turn more perverse when 
the managers' relevant horizon is short-as is typically the case, especially 
when, with bad corporate governance, compensation is linked to short-
term performance metrics. 
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THE MARKET-BASED APPROACH RESPONSE 
The ICMA, with the support of the IMF, proposes to resolve the failures in 
SDR by modifying the debt contracts' language. The new terms include a 
formula for aggregation of CA Cs and a clarification of the pari passu clause. 24 
The formula for aggregation allows bondholders across different series 
of bonds to vote collectively in response to a restructuring proposal. The 
decisions of a supermajority (defined by acceptance of the aggregate prin-
cipal amount2 ' of outstanding debt securities of all of the affected series) 
would be binding to all the bondholders across all series. 
The clarification of pari passu establishes that, unlike Judge Griesa's 
interpretation in Argentina's case, "the Issuer shall have no obligation to 
effect equal or ratable payment(s) at any time" with respect to any other 
external indebtedness of the issuer, and in particular the issuer "shall have 
no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a 
condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa'' (ICMA, 2014, r). 
In other words, ICMA states that pari passu does not mean what Judge 
Griesa interpreted it to mean. 
These new terms are improvements over the previous ones but leave 
some important issues unaddressed. We analyze these issues in the next 
section. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRIVATE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH: 
WHY A MARKET-BASED APPROACH WILL NOT SUFFICE 
SDRs are more complex than private debt restructurings. They involve 
dealing with contracts issued under different terms, under different 
legislation from different jurisdictions, and different currencies, over 
which there may not be obvious ways for comparing values when the 
contracts need to be rewritten. At those times, distributive conflicts get 
magnified.26 The private contractual approach does not solve these issues 
according to efficiency or equity considerations but on the basis of rela-
tive bargaining strength (related, for instance, to the ability to withstand 
large litigation costs and delays). Outcomes are generally inefficient and 
inequitable. That is why no government relies on the private contractual 
approach within its boundaries for private debts. The advocates of the 
private contractual approach have never explained why, if it were as good 
as they claim, it has been universally rejected. And as the complexities of 
SDR are greater, the need for a statutory approach is larger. 
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THE PROBLEM WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS 
The IMF estimates that roughly 30 percent of the $900 billion in out-
standing bonds issued under the old terms will mature in more than ten 
years. Approximately 20 percent of those stocks do not include any kind 
of CACs, and virtually all of the So percent that does include them have 
CACs that operate only at the level of each security (IMF, 2014). What 
would prevent the current problems from arising if those debts had to be 
restructured (events which, unfortunately, are especially likely to occur in 
the context of an anemic global economy)? 
Debt issued under the old terms could in principle be exchanged for 
securities that incorporate the new terms. But what would rule out hold-
out behavior if such a proposal were carried out? The vultures would have 
an incentive not to exchange existing bonds for these new bonds. There is 
no solution to this quandary within the improved contractual approach. 
INTERCREDITOR FAIRNESS 
There are complicated bargaining problems among classes of creditors. A 
supermajority voting does not solve them all. 
A simple supermajority rule could lead to a situation wherein junior 
creditors vote to have themselves treated equally with more senior credi-
tors and can impose their position through a supermajority. '7 This would 
make the senior status conditional on the outcome of the bargaining 
process. Indeed, if senior creditors were sufficiently small relative to the 
junior creditors, there is a presumption that their seniority would not be 
fully taken into account, and under the proposed arrangements, there is 
nothing they could do about it. Senior creditors would anticipate this 
possibility and would react by demanding different contract terms ex ante 
(for instance, an early senior creditor might limit the amount of junior 
creditor bonds that could be issued so as not to dilute voting interests, 
but that would have a deleterious effect on growth; alternatively, he or she 
could demand a higher interest rate'8). 
When countries issue debt under different jurisdictions, establishing 
priority of claims could be a daunting task, with multiple contradictions. 
Contracts could become inconsistent in crisis times. For example, the terms 
of a bond issued under the jurisdiction A could state that the holder of that 
bond has priority over all the other claims. But at the same time another 
bond issued under the jurisdiction B could state the same. If it were not 
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possible to satisfy both claims at the same time, how would priority be 
determined? Who would ultimately judge over it? It might be impossible 
to ensure the consistency of rulings from judges of different jurisdictions.'' 
The same bargaining problems may arise when a default is accom-
panied by a currency crisis, and the country issues debt under multiple 
currencies. How should debts that mature in the future be valued in the 
present in the event of a default? What nominal exchange rate should 
be used? The holders of debt denominated in a currency that is rapidly 
depreciating would claim that they should be weighed for purposes both 
of settlement and voting on the basis of a "notmal" (i.e., strong) exchange 
rate, while the holders of debt denominated in the other currencies would 
argue the opposite, as each party attempts to maximize what he or she 
receives. It would be unfair to effectively deprive domestic bondholders 
of their voting rights in the event of a temporary currency crisis; and if 
that happened, opportunistic bondholders in foreign denominated bonds 
would have an incentive to seize the opportunity to effectively discrimi-
nate against the domestic bondholders. 
Finally, how should the informal claimants (such as workers and pen-
sioners) be treated? Under CACs, they would have no voting rights. A 
solution to this problem within the contractual approach is not easy. 
Governments could decide to give full creditor rights to social security 
claimants. But then government agencies would be fiduciary for those 
claimants, which might "drown out" traditional creditors~an issue that 
would be anticipated and that would also be reflected in the interest rates 
and the contract terms. 
Under a decentralized private contractual approach, anticipating all of 
these possibilities would result in highly complex contracts, and solving 
the disputes would require intricate and lengthy negotiations, with com-
plex legal questions, and would almost surely cast a pall of uncertainty 
over what might happen in the event of the need for a restructuring. 
SIGNALING EQUILIBRIUM 
In the presence of imperfect information, debtors try to show that they 
are of a "good type" by using costly signals. 
" In the context of sovereign debt, debtors may choose excessively 
tough" jurisdictions to signal they are unlikely to default-jurisdictions 
that will make an eventual restructuring very difficult. Other debtors, by 
acting differently, would signal that they are more likely to restructure. 
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Hence, the net payoff of deviating to a more reasonable jurisdiction 
would be negative. The result is an inefficient global equilibrium.1° 
Besides, bargaining models with imperfect information often result in 
excessive delay-delay itself is a costly signal-again leading to an inef-
ficient global equilibrium. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES 
As described earlier, sovereign lending markets are featured by important 
political economy tensions both on the debtor and the creditor side. A 
purely market-based approach for debt crisis resolution would only exac-
erbate these tensions, leading to inefficient solutions. 
On the debtor side, a free-market solution will not internalize the neg-
ative externalities of an incumbent government willing to take actions 
that result in short-run benefits (like giving up on sovereign immunity to 
receive better financing conditions), leaving succeeding governments to 
pay the costs. The frameworks for SDR should recognize these perverse 
incentives and should consequently make it impossible to sign away sov-
ereign immunity. 
On the creditor side, a decentralized negotiation would face the oppo-
sition of investors who use sovereign bonds as collateral and, in a world 
of less than perfect corporate governance, will oppose the devaluation of 
the bonds in the short term, even if not writing debt off leads to more 
sustainability problems and larger haircuts in a longer term. 
POSSIBLE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS TO 
THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
There are other modifications to the standard contract that could improve 
the workings of the market-based approach. They entail regulations on 
contracts, changes in domestic legislation, and the inclusion of clauses 
that make debt payments contingent on the economic situation of the 
debtor. 
REGULATION OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (SCDSS) 
CDSs have been advertised as helping to complete markets.3' But they 
have failed to do so and instead have made matters worse. The use of 
SCDSs distorts incentives. 
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SCDSs distort incentives when they are used for insurance purposes 
(as noted earlier). But third parties can also demand SCDSs for specula-
tion purposes. This would not necessarily be a problem if there were no 
connections between the actions of the buyers and the interests of the 
sovereign. But the lack of transparency of these markets makes the con-
nections possible (and profitable).32 
To avoid conflicts of interest that could undermine the success of 
restructurings, and considering that the opacity of CDSs markets makes 
regulation too difficult, all CDS positions of parties involved in the 
restructuring negotiations should be fully disclosed." 
REINSTATING VARIANTS OF THE CHAMPERTY DEFENSE 
If investors who purchase debt in default were willing to settle under 
"reasonable" conditions, they would just provide a liquidity service in 
the markets for defaulted debt and could thus contribute to avoiding 
an even larger depression in bond prices in such circumstances. But 
that is not what vulture funds do. Reinstating variants of the cham-
perty defense that prohibit the purchase of defaulted debt with the 
intent of litigating against the issuer, together with a clarification of 
the pari passu clause, would undermine the vultures' business, correct-
ing the many inefficiencies associated with their behavior that we have 
identified.34 
GDP-INDEXED BONDS 
With GDP-indexed bonds, the principal is indexed to the nominal GDP 
of the country. The contingent element in the contract improves debt 
sustainability, as it makes debt obligations less burdensome when debt 
repayment is more difficult and vice versa. Creditors also benefit from a 
lower probability of default. 
These securities may also be an effective part of SDR. Exchanging 
fixed-coupon bonds with GDP-indexed bonds would be akin to a 
debt-equity swap. The inclusion of this contingency clause would 
align the incentives of the debtor and the creditors, as each would 
benefit from the faster growth of the country. (Similar benefits might 
be achieved through the issuance of ordinary bonds, which automati-
cally convert to GDP-linked bonds in the extreme events associated 
With crises.) 
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The capacity for countercyclical fiscal policies would also improve. The 
numbers may be significant: Bank of England economists (Barr, Bush, 
and Pienkowski, 2014) estimate that GDP-linked bonds can increase fis-
cal space, that is, they can increase the level of what is called "sustainable 
debt."35 (It must be noted, however, that "debt limit" is a subjective con-
cept whose quantification requires taking a stance on the expectations 
about the government's capacity for generating revenues-a complicated 
issue over which it is relatively easy to make wrong assumptions, espe-
cially in the most volatile economies, which are the ones more likely to 
need restructurings. The IMF itself has been systematically overestimat-
ing the speed of recovery of economies in crises and the multipliers in 
response to the conditionalities imposed on the bailed-out countries. See 
Guzman, 2or4). 
Even if these proposals were incorporated, the contractual approach 
would be insufficient. The approach needs to be complemented by a mul-
tinational legal framework-the object of analysis of the next section. 
A MULTINATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOR 
A majority of countries have become convinced both by experience 
and the force of the arguments of the previous sections that the private 
contractual approach, no matter how improved, will not solve the basic 
problem of SDR. These countries are advocating for institutionalizing a 
multinational statutory solution, as reflected in Resolution 68/304, passed 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 9, 2or4. 
GUIDELINES FOR THE FRAMEWORK 
The framework must recognize the limitations of the private contractual 
approach. It needs to solve the "too little, too late" syndrome and the pos-
sibility that restructuring would take too long. It also needs to ensure a 
reasonably fair treatment of all parties. 
Any framework for SDR must take account of the primacy of the 
functions of the state, its obligations to its citizens, and the "social con-
tract" the state has with its citizens (Stiglitz et al., 2015). 
Although there are differences between sovereign debt and corporate 
debt restructurings, there ate also important analogies. Thus, some of the 
provisions of Chapters 9 and II of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code should be 
considered (Stiglitz, 2002a, 20roa).36 
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DEADLINES 
The sovereign should iniriate the resrructuring in a rimely way. The 
framework should provide the right incenrives for avoiding delays in the 
initiation and in the finalization of the restructuring. Therefore, it must 
set specific deadlines for the different stages of the process. This would 
make rhe whole process more predictable. 
LENDING INTO ARREARS 
The framework must recognize the macroeconomic externalities associ-
ated with debt crisis resolution. Thus, it should facilitate countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Provisions of lending into arrears, according to 
which creditors who lend while the restructuring process is being carried 
on would receive senior treatment, should be contemplated. 
ST A YS 
Litigation induces costly delays. As previously described, it also creates a 
moral hazard problem, as it negatively affects creditors' incentives to enter 
into restructurings. Therefore, the framework should incorporate clauses 
of stays for litigation, which would prohibit litigation in courts between 
the initiation and the finalization of the restructuring process. 
Lirigations could still occur in jurisdictions that do not endorse the 
framework, remaining a problem, as a large proportion of debts will still 
be issued under those jurisdictions. However, judges of nonparticipating 
jurisdictions could consider the multinational framework as a reference 
on what good practice in SDR looks like. 
HARD LAW VERSUS SOFT LAW 
The design of the framework must consider what constitutes the set of 
principles on which all the parties involved would agree. One possibility 
could be to follow a "hard law" approach, in which counrries adhere to an 
international bankruptcy court. If the rulings of rhe court were enforce-
able, countries would be giving up on sovereign immunity. Of course, 
any international treaty entails giving up on sovereignty and compromis-
ing sovereign immunity. The benefit would be a more orderly restruc-
turing. But countries would, at least initially, worry about the fairness 
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of the tribunal. Besides, geopolitical problems would be intense: How 
would the members of the international court be appointed? What inter-
ests would they represent? Indeed, it might even be difficult, at least ini-
tially, to define the principles that should guide restructuring. The intense 
debates within countries over the design of bankruptcy law should make 
it clear that resolving these issues internationally might be difficult. 
The creditor countries would push for creditor-friendly principles, with 
the debtor countries advocating for the converse. 
There is a single principle countries could agree to that would restore 
a semblance of order to the global sovereign debt market: the restora-
tion of sovereign immunity. More precisely: there is a consensus that 
there should be restrictions on what counts as acceptable contracts. 
Individuals cannot sell themselves into slavery. Many countries do not 
allow certain kinds of perpetuities. There should be a global agreement 
that no country can surrender its sovereign immunity (even voluntarily). 
Such a restriction is particularly important given the political economy 
problems discussed earlier. It is too easy for a government today to sur-
render the sovereign immunity of some government in the future, in 
rerurn for money that would enhance its popularity and the wealth of 
its supporters. 
To this should be added a framework that would facilitate restruc-
turing. This would occur through what might be called a "soft law" 
approach, with the creation of an oversight commission with the mis-
sion of mediating and supervising the restructuring process. The com-
mission would also maintain a registry of the debt stocks. The members 
of the commission would be countries that endorse the multinational 
framework. The commission would not rule over different alternatives. 
Instead, the sovereign would finalize the process with a final proposal and 
the commission would produce statements about the reasonability of the 
process and the final proposal. This approach would serve to legitimate 
the restructuring or, alternatively, to legitimate positions that speak of 
illegitimate restructurings.37 
CONCLUSIONS 
Restructuring is not a zero-sum game. The mechanisms in place can 
have large effects on the overall economic performance of the coun-
tries involved. The existing institutional arrangements make the sum 
too negative, as they delay the initiation of restructurings and lead to 
,+ 
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"solutions" that do not promote economic recovery-making recessions 
more severe and persistent overall. Deficiencies in the restructuring pro-
cess also get reflected ex ante in the terms and volumes transacted in 
sovereign debt markets. 
The world of debt restructuring needs to move to a different equi-
librium. There is consensus on the necessity of this, but there are dif-
ferent views on how to move forward.38 On the one hand, the business 
community and the IMF advocate for tweaking the terms of contracts. 
Although the suggested new terms (aggregation of CACs and clarifica-
tion of rhe pari passu clause) are improvements over the old terms (terms 
that clearly did not work), they still leave a legacy of problems unad-
dressed. There are further improvements that can be implemented, as we 
discussed earlier. 
But with incomplete contracts, even with all those improvements, a 
variety of problems will remain. In times of default, debt contracts will 
need to be rewritten. Under a market-based approach for restructurings, 
outcomes will be more determined by bargaining power than by consid-
erations of efficiency and equity. Particularly disturbing is the fact that 
most countries that are entering debt restructurings are in particularly 
weak positions and are therefore particularly vulnerable to pressure from 
creditors to agree to terms that are adverse to their long-term interests. 
And the knowledge that this is so gives rise itself to bad lending practices, 
especially in the context of the political economy problems we discussed 
earlier: creditors encourage more lending than is socially efficient, in 
the knowledge that they can use their market power to extract a favor-
able outcome for themselves in the event of a crisis. At least in the past, 
practices of the IMF, which provided funds to the government to bail 
out the creditors-ensuring that they were paid in full-only exacerbated 
the problem.39 
A comprehensive solution requires the implementation of a statutory 
approach at the multinational level-an approach that helps "complete" 
contracts. The framework needs to address the limitations of the current 
approach. It needs to redefine the balance among the parties involved in 
the negotiation. It should be built respecting the principles on which the 
different actors involved would agree. 
For now, the single most important change over which there is the pos-
sibility of getting agreement is the restoration of sovereign immunity and 
the recognition that no government can sign away sovereign immunity 
for itself or for successor governments. 
24 GENERAL ISSUES OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
We believe a soft law approach that entails a more active role for a 
quasi judiciary can mitigate some, perhaps many, of the inefficiencies and 
inequities noted earlier. While this approach is not a panacea, we believe 
it represents a substantial step forward-and a substantial step beyond 
the private contractual approach. 
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r. It is not high debt per se that is bad for economic growth or full employment, 
as careless studies that were influential in the policy debate have suggested (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2010; see, in particular, the important critique of Herndon, Ash, and 
Pollin, 2014). Indeed, standard general equilibrium theory argues that there is a full-
employment equilibrium regardless of the level of debt (Stiglitz, 2014). Instead, it 
is the difficulty of running expansionary macro policies when primary surpluses are 
allocated to debt payments in times of recessions (which are indeed often associated 
with high debt) that malces debt a constraint for economic recovery. 
Note, too, that even then it is not only the economic constraints that matter, 
but those arising out of political economy-a political economy which itself is 
affected by the largely ideological research referred to in the previous paragraph. 
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In particular, for countries like the United States, which can borrow even now at a 
negative real interest rate-and borrowed at very low real interest rates even when 
its debt to GDP ratio was in excess of 130 percent-borrowing for public invest-
ments that yield significantly higher returns than the cost of capital can improve the 
nation's balance sheet. 
2. The only situation in which the temporary assistance (bailout) might mal{e sense 
is if there is a liquidity crisis, e.g., markets are irrationally pessimistic about the coun-
try's prospects, with the evidence that they are wrong expected to be revealed in the 
not too distant future. But it is ironic that those in the financial market who normally 
profess such faith in markets suddenly abandon that faith when markets turn skepti-
cal on them; and that at that point, they seem willing to rely on the judgment of a 
government bureaucrat or an international civil servant over that of the market. There 
are other irrationalities implicit in these arguments: it is sometimes suggested that 
if the intervention stabilizes, say, the exchange rate, that will restore confidence and 
prevent contagion. But if it is known that the reason that the exchange rate has been 
stabilized is that there has been IMF intervention, why should the stabilization of the 
exchange rate change beliefs, and especially so if the intervention is announced to be 
short term? And if there are reasons to believe that the IMF would not intervene in 
other countries (e.g., because they are less systematically important or less politically 
connected), then why should the intervention in one country change beliefs about the 
equilibrium exchange rate in the others? It is even possible that it could have adverse 
effects (Stiglitz, 1998). 
3. Even if the funds were offered without such conditions, to the extent that the 
funds are not used for addressing the fundamental problems that make debts unsus-
tainable, the country would be worse off over the long run, unless there was com-
mitment to provide these funds indefinitely-which is in effect equivalent to a debt 
write-off. 
4. Since bonds replaced loans, nearly 40 percent of restructurings ended in re-
default or another restructuring within five years (Gelpern, 2015). 
5. And when they do not take too long, they may not achieve the objectives of 
restructuring that .we define in the section on the objectives of restructuring. This is 
the case of the Greek debt restructuring in 2012. The deal was mostly a socialization 
of banks' debts that was not conducive to the recovery of the economy. Three years 
later, the country is still suffering, with an more deeply depressed economy: GDP has 
fallen by 25 percent since the beginning of the recession, and the unemployment rate 
was above 25 percent in January 2015 (as reported by the Hellenic Statistical Authority 
Labor Force Survey, 2015). 
6. Where an American court seemingly has tal{en an action affecting payments on 
Argentinean bonds issued in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, and a 
British court has ruled that they cannot do so (England and Wales High Court (Chan-
cery Division) Decisions, Case No.: HC-2014-000704). 
7· This is not the first attempt to implement a framework of this nature. The 
IMF had called for the implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
(Krueger, 2001; although the IMF executive board would have determined sustain-
ability and judged on the adequacy of the debtor's economic policies, a task in which it 
has not excelled in recent times (see Guzman and Heymann, 2015)), and the report of 
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the International Commission of Experts of the International Monetary and Financial 
System appointed by the president of the General Assembly of the United Nations had 
pointed out the necessity of exploring enhanced approaches for the restructuring of 
sovereign debt (Stiglitz et al., 2010). 
8. We -will explain some of the reasons for the growth of vulture funds later in the 
chapter. 
9. In private debt markets, other considerations relating to adverse selection 
and moral hazard also militate for at least some reliance on debt. See, e.g., Stiglitz 
(1985). The problems of costly state enforcement for sovereign debt markets have, 
we think, been greatly exaggerated, and there have been several important proposals 
for such bonds. (Argentina actually introduced GDP-linked bonds as part of its debt 
restructuring.) 
ro. This would be true even if lenders were risk averse and markets highly com-
petitive. Under these assumptions, each lender would receive the certainty equivalent 
return from each of his or her investments. Though such an assumption dominates 
within the finance literature, there are reasons to be skeptical. Still, the conclusion 
holds that forcing the borrower to absorb all the risk is not efficient. 
II. Importantly, it also depends on the discrepancy between the expectations on the 
future capacity of repayment and the realizations that determine the actual capacity of 
repayment. See Guzman (2014). 
12. The nature of the distress also depends on actions of the creditors, i.e., their 
willingness to roll over. 
13. There is some controversy over whether there is a stigma that makes it more dif-
ficult for the borrower to borrow after the resolution of the debt. There is theory (and 
some evidence) that markets are forward looking, infer that the cost of bankruptcy is 
sufficiently high that few if any countries go into default if they can avoid it-and that 
therefore there is no inference of a flawed "character trait" that can be made from a 
default; as a result of the deaning of balance sheets, at least following a deep restruc-
turing, there will be more access to credit markets. Russia's 1998 default falls into this 
model. See Stiglitz {2orob). 
14. That is, there are both macro-inefficiencies and micro-inefficiencies. In the 
chaos surrounding disorderly debt distress situations, assets typically do not get used 
in the most efficient way, and complementary investments to those assets are not 
undertal{en. 
15. It is important to realize that the normal presumption that markets on their own 
are efficient fails in this context for a large number of reasons: there are imperfections 
and asymmetries and incomplete risk markets (and in such situations, there is a strong 
presumption that markets are not efficient). Moreover, the context with which we are 
most concerned-in which there is significant underutilization of resources-is again 
one in which there is a presumption of market inefficiency. Finally, the bargaining 
that surrounds debt resolution is itself evidence of the absence of perfect competition, 
another essential assumption if markets are to be efficient. See, e.g., Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986). 
16. The judge's decision was peculiar in other ways: it forced the trust bank into 
which funds were deposited to enforce his decision, i.e., the trustee was forbidden 
from distributing funds that it had received on behalf of the restructured bonds. Thus, 
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to enforce one contract, it had to break other contractual arrangements. There seemed 
to be little rationale for the court's decision about which contracts to respect and 
which to abrogate. Thus, the decision was not (as it has sometimes been put) about the 
sanctity of contracts (see chap. 4 by Sergio Chodos in this volume). 
17. The upshot is that vulture funds are poised to get returns on their "investments" 
more than five times greater than the holders of the exchange bonds. 
18. In the 1990s, bonds issued in the London market under the English law con-
tained CACs, while bonds issued in the New York market under the law of the state of 
New York did not (Eichengreen and Mody, 2003). Mexico was the first country to put 
these clauses in its contracts under the jurisdiction of the state of New York in 2003. 
19. In a world of globalization, the distinction between foreign and domestic bonds 
may not be dear. Moreover, the rules of the game would be expected to change the mix. 
20. This is especially true when there are large macro-economic disturbances. See 
Miller and Stiglitz (1999, 2010). 
2I. See Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 961 F. Supp. 82, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 
and 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1998). 
22. Even with marked to market, there is always a chance that the country will 
recover and the bonds will pay off. If the write-down is greater than the expected loss 
(recall that if ther.e is not a restructuring now, there is a chance, even a likelihood, that 
matters will get even worse, and the necessary write-down will be even greater), then 
the write-down will be associated with a decrease today in the value of the firm. 
23. Similar problems arise, of course, with domestic debt, and played an important 
role in the evolution of the U.S. financial crisis. See Stiglitz (101ob). 
24. See Gelpern, Heller, and Setser (1016) for a description of the ICMA's proposal. 
25. There is still a problem when debt is issued in different currencies and there are 
marked changes in exchange rates (as in the East Asian crisis). Depending on the rules, 
it may be relatively easy for a vulture fund to buy enough bonds to block a restructur-
ing or to obtain a settlement that advantages it over other claimants (the issue is more 
extensively analyzed in the section analyzing the limitations of the ICMA-IMF solu-
tion). Similar problems can arise when there are different maturities: long-dated bonds 
might, for instance, sell at a marked discount relative to principal values. 
26. That is, if the country had issued only one set of bonds, there would be a clear 
meaning to equity: repayments should be proportional to the face value of the bonds. 
This is not so if, as is the case in practice, there are many different kinds of bonds. 
27. In the world of sovereign bonds, bondholders are on an equal foot. However, 
some creditors (the IMF for instance) are de facto treated as senior creditors. But 
nothing prevents the possibility that in the future there could be unsubordinated debt 
not only de facto to official creditors but also de jure to other bondholders. Indeed, 
the legal literature suggests that this is feasible (cf Chatterjee and Eyigungor (1015) 
for a concrete proposal). A comprehensive solution must also address this concerns 
(Mooney, 2015). 
28. Moreover, the set of contracts in the market will respond endogenously to the 
rules of the game. For instance, the senior debt contract could have a provision that 
in the event of a default, the face value of what is owed is multiplied such that, under 
the aggregation clause, those bondholders have sufficient votes to block any proposal 
by junior creditors. 
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29. See Guzman and Stiglitz (2015b) for a description of the interplay between legal 
jurisdictions in the case of Argentina's restructuring after the 2001 crisis. 
30. This is a standard result in the theory of adverse selection and signaling. 
3r. Arrow and Debreu have established that only if there were a complete set of risk 
markets would competitive markets be efficient. Some in the financial market there-
fore argued that introducing new securities (such as CDSs) helps complete the market 
and thus improves societal welfare. But that conclusion ignores the basic insights of 
the theory of the second best, which demonstrates that in the presence of multiple 
market failures, reducing the scope of one could actually (and under plausible condi-
tions often-would) lead to a decrease in societal welfare. Thus, Newbery and Stiglitz 
(1982) showed that eliminating barriers to trade, in the presence of imperfections in 
risk markets, could lead all individuals in all countries to be worse off. 
In this context, Guzman and Stiglitz (2014a, 2015a, 2015d) have shown that.intro-
ducing these new instruments for betting may actually increase economic volatility 
and lower output permanently. 
32. The recent case of Argentine debt restructuring illustrates how perverse incen-
tives can turn. In the aftermath of Judge Griesa's injunction that blocked the payments 
of the country to its bondholders, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) classified the credit event as a default. Interestingly, one of the members of 
ISDA committee was Elliott Management, the same vulture fund that was litigating 
against the country. (The debt contract only specified that Argentina turn over the 
requisite funds to the "agent"-which Argentina did. Argentina was thus not in breach 
of the contracts it had signed in the process of restructuring. Indeed, Argentina had 
even warned investors in its contract of the possibility of these difficulties. That is why 
the so-called default has been labeled a Griesafault, to distinguish it from a normal 
default, wherein a party actually breaches a key contract provision. See Guzman and 
Stiglitz [2014b]). 
33. Some have suggested going further: banning the purchase of SCDSs by third 
parties (Brooks, Guzman, Lombardi, and Stiglitz, 2015). 
34. One could even imagine some variant of such a clause being inserted into the 
contract: that no secondary purchasers of the bond could make a claim in court for 
an amount greater than the price at which he or she had purchased the bond. While 
such a provision arguably might lower the price of the bond at issuance (requiring the 
sovereign borrower to pay a higher interest rate), the effect is likely to be minimal: few 
buy a bond on the expectation that it will go into default. 
35. When debt becomes too high, then, depending on the rate of growth of the 
economy and the rate of interest, the ratio of debt to GDP increases without bound. 
Barr, Bush, and Pienkowski (2014) argue that switching to GDP-linked bonds increases 
the critical threshold by some 45 percent. 
36. Raffer (1990, 2015) explains that the essential points of the special insolvency 
procedure for municipalities in the United States (Chapter 9, Title 11, U.S.C.) can be 
easily applied to sovereigns. 
37. For an analysis of the international-law elements on which a multinational 
formal framework could be drawn, see Howse (2016). 
38. The different chapters in this volume reflect both the consensus and the 
differences in views on how to move forward. See, for example, Conn (2016), 
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Herman (2016), Howse (2016), Kaiser (2016), Ocampo (2016), and Raffer (2016). See 
also Brooks and Lombardi (2015), Gelpern (2015), and Guzman and Stiglitz (2015c). 
39. For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see Stiglitz (2002b). 
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